

A historical map of the region around Badajoz, showing the city's fortifications and surrounding areas. The map is rendered in a sepia tone. The city of Badajoz is depicted as a large, irregularly shaped fortification with a central area labeled 'Yelues Plaza capital'. Surrounding the city are various landmarks and geographical features, including 'Terros de Malpica' to the north, 'Atalaya de Sosm' to the east, and 'Atalaya de las Terrinas' to the west. The map also shows rivers and other smaller settlements. The title 'Corographía y descripción del territorio de la plaza de Badaxos y fronteras del Reyno de Portugal confinantes a ella' is overlaid on the map in a dark blue, serif font.

## Corographía y descripción del territorio de la plaza de Badaxos y fronteras del Reyno de Portugal confinantes a ella

*Chorography and description of the territory of the  
stronghold of Badaxos and boundaries of the Kingdom of  
Portugal that it borders on.*



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### *Fossil topography of distrust.*

This map is a fossil, the vestige of the remote past of this border, a reminder of what it will never be again. Throughout history, borders have been the abrasive zones of national tectonic plates, hot zones, zones of friction. Along side it, there is a complete topography of distrust, spiked with castles and prejudice, mental palisades and stone walls. It was the privileged site of fear of the other side, of what is different, suspicion and apprehension.

The Hispano-Portuguese border was also that type of scar. A dry scar of history and two parallel deserts of poverty, depopulation and underdevelopment. The “*Raya*” was the privileged place of scaramouches and raids, of acts of war that were ordered from afar by royal courts on maps like this one. A map on which neither pain nor people are observed, but only movements of troops, defenses, strategies and pillaging. A work of the modest spies of those times, a task that we would like to remember in order to measure the distance that separates us from that historical situation.

Today the Hispano-Portuguese border is a privileged place of communication and knowledge, of sympathy and affection, of fertile complicity of the two national identities and of the common nostalgia for the future. Today the border permits, incites, even demands, the topography of friendship. And to celebrate this historical reunion, nothing better than to recall what we were and do not desire ever to be again. Like a votive offering reminding us of the crippled arm or leg, and that is kept to better appreciate, savor, the health that we now enjoy.

To commemorate the ten years of activity of the Gabinete de Iniciativas Transfronterizas<sup>1</sup>, we wanted to publish and make a gift of this old map of the border of war of the past, an unknown and heretofore unpublished document dormant for centuries in the Archives of a Nordic country. To conjure up rusty familiar phantoms and celebrate how far we have come from the situation that it describes. In order to build our present relationship on the knowledge of our historical disunions, so that we shall not forget and thereby avoid repeating the errors of the past.

It is in this spirit that the Government of Extremadura and the Portuguese authorities have worked for the past ten years. And with this spirit we would like to continue contributing in the future to opening Extremadura to Portugal, from a position of scrupulous respect for the identity of our neighbors, but knowing that we are all embarking united on this old peninsular stone raft on the sea of history that has many unique points in common yet to be explored.

Ignacio Sánchez Amor  
Director of the President's Department of the  
Junta de Extremadura.

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<sup>1</sup> Office of Transborder Initiatives

***“Chorography and description of the territory of the stronghold of Badajoz and boundaries of the Kingdom of Portugal that it borders on.”***

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In December 1640, after sixty years of annexation of the Kingdom of Portugal and its empire to the Spanish monarchy, Philip IV was deposed in Lisbon and the Duke of Braganza was acclaimed as the new king with the name of João IV of Portugal. This act triggered a long war (1640-1668), with ominous consequences for the border zones of Portugal and Castile, especially for Spanish Extremadura and the Portuguese territories of Alentejo and Beira Baixa, the main scenarios of the war. The Hispano-Portuguese conflict ended an extensive period of tranquility on both sides of the “*Raya*”. For decades, men and merchandise had ignored the existence of a political and military border that was now again clearly marked. The Portuguese and the Castilians, formerly friends and neighbors and subjects of the same monarchy, became irreconcilable enemies as of 1640, separated by a changing political border that time and armed deeds would take care to redefine and settle.

The Military Archives of the city of Stockholm have for centuries had custody of a map of exceptional value for a historical understanding of this spatial-temporal context. The document shows the borders between the kingdoms of Castile and Portugal as they were from 1657 to 1659, offering an exhaustive description of the most active and fundamental front in the war: the so-called “*Extremadura front*”, which in this document is limited on the north and south by the towns of Albuquerque and Mourão. Together with other maps and plans, the one which is now published here for the first time, would travel from Spain to the Nordic country by the hand of the Swedish diplomat Johan Gabriel Sparwenfeld, after being acquired in Madrid in 1690 at the auction that liquidated the colossal heritage that the Marquis of Heliche,

son of Don Luis Méndez de Haro, prime minister of Philip IV, and grandnephew of the also prime minister of that monarch, the Count-Duke of Olivares. From that time it has remained unpublished in the military archives of Stockholm. The Office of Transborder Initiatives of the Government of Extremadura wanted to recover a picture that was born as a consequence of war; the picture of a *Raya* whose governors on both sides were set on tracing and marking it out to divide a nearby territory shared by localities on both sides of the border. The document is now made available to be enjoyed by all those interested in their common past, going back to the scenarios that were the reason for their existence.

The war caused by the *Bragancista* rebellion which was the reason that this map was drawn, was a war of positions, almost static, where there were hardly any important confrontations. The dispute was characterized on both sides by the scant activity of the ever-insufficient and badly paid troops. Raiding and pillaging became the most common actions of undisciplined armies looking as much for their own supplies as diminishing enemy resources. And at their head were officers who were mostly inoperative and, as A. Rodríguez Sánchez expressed it, “producers of failures” who became rich at the cost of the population they should have been defending.

For two decades, the War with Portugal was a conflict unattended by powers that were focusing more on the various fronts open in other scenarios of the Spanish monarchy’s territories at that time. The resources of war in Madrid were channeled to putting down the revolt of Catalunya –also up in arms in 1640– and to sustain the unending wars with the United Provinces and with France. This priority and the lack of attention to the Portuguese front ended up prolonging an exhausting war with fatal consequences for the towns in the *Raya* that bore the conflict directly. This territory supported basically two types of operations practiced by both armies. The most frequent were the punishing expeditions directed at the scantily garrisoned border strongholds, but the effects of which were felt throughout a considerably wider scenario than just the border. The other military operations were the sieges and blockades that circumscribed, above all, the central border zone around the strongholds of Olivenza, Mourão, Juromenha and especially Badajoz and Elvas. The city of Badajoz – permanent headquarters of the Royal Army of Extremadura, created due to the rebellion of Portugal– and Elvas, both a short distance from the border and perfectly aligned with Lisbon and Madrid, became the habitual scenes of military operations and for that reason suffered the effects of the war intensely.

Only exceptionally did the armies actually face each other directly on the battle field, as was the case at Montijo, during the first years of conflict. This armed battle in 1644 is shown on the map which is the object of this study, where it is labeled “*el paraje donde se dio la Batalla del Montijo con pérdida y rota del ejército del rebelde de Portugal*” (“*the scene of the Battle of Montijo where the rebel Portuguese army was broken and lost.*”).

These three ways of making war accompanied Gainza’s chorography of the Portuguese-Extremadura border without exclusion, making it a testimony of exceptional interest for understanding the development of the Portuguese War of Restoration on the Extremadura front.

Raids, continual mobilization of personnel, recruitment, military levies and drafts, fiscal pressure, forays and skirmishes along the border, conquests and reconquests of strongholds and continual relieving of the General of the Army, who would abandon the Portuguese front for more promising war scenes, for a long time characterized a war that heavily wore down, both economically and psychologically, the localities of the *Raya* in this border territory. The sieges of Badajoz and Elvas in 1658 and 1659, respectively, both of which involved confrontations of the two armies, meant the close of a long period in which the War with Portugal received only secondary attention.

Only when the remaining war fronts closed did the energies of the Spanish monarchy –already very weakened– concentrate on the “Portuguese enterprise”. Especially after the Pyrenees Peace Treaty, signed with France in 1659, would the Monarchy become obsessed with recovering the “usurped” throne. This title to property is obvious on Gainza’s map, which bears the coat of arms of the monarch, Philip IV, which included the Kingdom of Portugal, in a preeminent and visible position.

The reaction of Madrid came too late, however. The alliances that Portugal had managed to weave with other European nations tipped the scales in its favor. The official recognition of Portuguese independence came in 1668 after a resounding Castilian defeat in the outskirts of Villaviciosa (1665). The Peace Treaty –ratified by both Lisbon and Madrid– indicated in its third article the need for both peoples to again have “*buena correspondencia y amistad, sin mostrar sentimiento de las ofensas y daños pasados y... comunicar y frecuentar los límites de uno y otro, y ejercer comercio con toda seguridad...*” (“*good, friendly correspondence, without show of feelings for past offense and damages and ... communicate and frequent one and another’s borders, and carry out trade in complete safety....*”). After almost three decades of confrontations, the border would again be established based on “*los*

*límites y confrontaciones que tenía antes de la guerra*” (“*the limits and natural affinity that it had before the war.*”).

A peaceful border where people live together, approaching each other and integrating, a long way from that other closed and tense one that materialized in the various conflicts in which the Crowns of Castile and Portugal had confronted each other from the Middle Ages to the beginning of contemporary times.

It is that military border that came out of conflict, which is offered in the *Chorography and Description of the territory of the stronghold of Badaxos and boundaries of the Kingdom of Portugal it borders on*, drawn by Bernabé de Gainza Allafor, an officer of the Secretariat of Sea War and a member of King Philip IV’s *Junta de Aposento*.

What Bernabé Gainza recreates in this map is a chorography, that is a geographic description of a territory on which strategic military information is superimposed. The map was drawn at two different moments, which may be appreciated both in the physical appearance of the document and in the chronologies of the facts given on it. The first part, was logically the chorography, which the author signed in Madrid on August 4, 1658. It is quite possible that Gainza did this work for Luis Méndez de Haro, prime minister of King Philip IV at that time, and who was in those days preparing to leave the court with the intention of lifting the siege of Badajoz imposed by the Portuguese army since June of that year. It was not the first time that this important stronghold was the military target of the Portuguese troops; the year before, Portugal had attempted to take over the city in reprisal for the taking of Olivenza by the Duke of San Germán in spring of 1657.

However, it was the Portuguese siege of Badajoz of 1658 that made up one of the most important feats of arms of the Hispano-Portuguese war from the time the conflict broke out. At that time, a change in the focus of the Portuguese War, coinciding with decreased tension on the Catalanian front, was taking place in Madrid. This allowed human and military resources to be channeled to the Portuguese front, making more forceful offensive and defensive action possible. Luis Méndez de Haro would take charge of this personally, going to Badajoz with an imposing army, sufficiently equipped and well informed to break the siege. Knowing the terrain was the first step to dominating it, so cartographic information was vital in an operation of this size. Gainza’s map had to have been part of that informative mission, at least the chronology and data given on it point directly in this direction.



At the end of August 1658, the first news with regard to troops sent to break the siege arrived in the besieged city; early in October their arrival materialized, allowing the city to be liberated in just a few days. The breaking of the siege of Badajoz was exaggeratedly celebrated, causing the Spanish minister to be congratulated by numerous European personalities for a great military deed which it really was not. Gainza very probably witnessed this fact. He had drawn the chorography in Madrid, that is the map with the geographic description that enabled the army to know and travel over the roads, fords and river crossings through the territory near the Raya. It is significant that of the information contained in the 25 entries with which Gainza illustrated the chorography, the majority is devoted to marking points of transit: seven are roads, three are river crossings and eleven are fords, while four of these entries locate places ideal for preparing ambushes. The last entry locates the place where the already mentioned battle of Montijo had taken place. Its insertion is due more to the need to know where that confrontation took place for military purposes than to commemorate a battle that was considered victorious for the Castilian army.

Over the chorography, and by now in Extremadura, Gainza drew the siege of the city of Badajoz and its lifting –which came about in mid-October of 1658– and the beginning of the siege of the neighboring *Yelves* (Elvas) at the end of that same month. For this reason, the author made two additions to the original map, one called “*Nueva Declaración*” (“*New Declaration*”) and the other entitled “*Yelves sitiada por el ejército del Rey Nuestro Señor desde 22 de octubre de 1658*” (“*Yelves besieged by the army of our Lord the King since October 22, 1658.*”).

In the first of them, he describes in 28 entries the line of circumvallation and the siege designed by the French military engineer, Nicolas de Langres, then at the orders of the Portuguese army, as well as some of the defenses planned by those besieged. Gainza shows the information from the beginning of the siege to its lifting four months later, as described in the text at the end of the New Declaration:

*“Después de quatro meses de sitio a trece de octubre se retiró el Exercito Tirano de Portugal a Yelves y Campo Mayor dexando el yntento del sitio de Badajoz con pérdida de mucha gente de Ynfantería y Caballería, sólo con el rezelo de que acometidos en las Líneas por el ejército del Rey, que mandava el excelentísimo Señor Don Luis de Haro, podían ser desbaratados, y hallándose ya libre la ciudad (de) Badajoz...”*

*(“After four months of siege, on October thirteenth, the Tyrant Army of Portugal withdrew to Yelves and Campo Mayor leaving the attempted siege of Badajoz with loss of*

*many people in Infantry and Cavalry, only with the fear that attacked in the Lines by the army of the King, that was commanded by His Excellency Don Luis de Haro, they might be disbanded and the city of Badajoz already being free ... ”)*

The other addition, physically pasted on the bottom of the map, refers in eleven entries to the first moments in which the Castilian troops, commanded by Luis Méndez de Haro, laid siege to the city of Elvas, where the Portuguese army that had fled Badajoz had taken refuge under the command of General Juan Méndez de Vasconcellos. On this occasion, Gainza does not mention, as he had in the case of Badajoz, how the operation ended, possibly because it was clearly humiliating for the Castilian army. In mid-January 1959, the Count of Castañeda was able to introduce sufficient aid into the stronghold to make victory by the Portuguese troops viable, which caused –as he himself qualified it in a letter sent to the Duke of Braganza– *“a maior vergonha que os castelhanos padeceram em muito tempo porque deixaram os quartéis com tudo o que havia e os fortes guarnecidos com mestres de campo e pessoas de muito porte que se renderam”* (“*the greatest shame suffered by the Castilians in a long time, because they left the barracks with everything in them and forts garrisoned by field marshals and persons of much importance surrendered.*”)

In accordance with the intention and function of the map, Gainza recreates two levels of information intimately related to each other. We are thus able to differentiate between the physical, strictly chorographic elements represented on it, and those others pertaining to a political and military plane which are those that give the document its temporal and historical dimension, because they represent the acts of the men that participated in the deeds that Gainza narrates in his work.

On the first **physical** or purely topographical level, it would seem of interest to highlight the scale in common leagues used by the author, who represents a space of about 13 leagues wide (around 65 kilometers) and somewhat more than 9 leagues high (about 45 kilometers) which makes up the territory located between the localities of Montijo and Estremoz –from east to west– and Albuquerque and Mourão –from north to south.

It is in this space where Bernabé de Gainza draws the most important topographic elements in the area, mainly forests, streams, hills and mountains. Among the forests shown, the most outstanding because of its enormity, is the one called *Deesa de Bótoa*, which measures over 6 leagues from east to west (some 30 kilometers) and extends throughout the area on the right bank of the Guadiana River before it passes through Badajoz.

Another two forests are shown near Badajoz and Villaviciosa, the so-called *Bosque del Pinar* –of which there are still some trees standing– near first of the two and the one called *Bosque de el Tirano*, which is crossed by the *La Seca* or *Asseca* River, in the outskirts of the second. There are also another two lesser wooded areas near Campo Maior –*Monte de la Goudiña* and *Deesa de San Pedro* –near Elvas and Olivenza.

Another element of the landscape that is included on the map is the fluvial network, the surface of the drawing being literally irrigated with rivers and streams. The main one, naturally, is the Guadiana River, in its course through the area from Montijo to Ferreira and Mourão, one section along its course forming the border between the two kingdoms. Only two bridges communicate the banks of the river along its entire course, one of them located in Badajoz and the other near Olivenza, although the latter, as shown on the map, was “*demolido en Octubre de 1649*” (“*demolished in October 1649*”). This lack of bridges on the Guadiana in Extremadura would have been made up for with the numerous fords and crossings where it was possible to cross the river, and our cartographer shows up to 16 different fords on it in detail, facilitating exhaustive information about them in the legend: exact location, best time to cross them, type of material that can be taken across, etc.

The rest of the rivers drawn, which make up part of the Guadiana basin, are in all cases tributaries on both banks of this river. On the left are the rivers and streams called the *Lantrino*, the *Albuera*, *Rivillas* –with their tributaries, the *Mañoca*, *Valdesevilla* and *Caalmón*–, *Arroyo de Hinojales*, *Olivenza*, *Arramapalla*, and *Táliga*. On the opposite bank, the *Guerrero*, *Xébora*, *Caya*, *Cayola*, *Cancau*, *Barcha*, *Mures*, *La Seca* and *Lucifre Rivers* flow into the Guadiana. The Gévora River is also shown with its tributaries the *Bótoa*, *Río de las Aguas*, and *Abrolongo*. In this last case, there is an error because below the town of Ouguela, the river splits into two, the *Abrolongo* or *Abrilongo* –which continues forming the borderline and which the map calls only the Gévora– and the River Gévora itself, which flows toward the Carrión Hermitage. He also makes another mistake in drawing the Táliga River, making it go through the towns of *Alconchel*, *Cheles* and *Morón* or *Mourão*, when in reality it only goes through the first of them.

The last element of the landscape on the map which should be mentioned are the hills and mountains, for which he gives no detailed information as relative as the above features, giving only those zones with a more accidental relief, such as the north of the territory –in the area around Alburquerque– or the area west of Elvas, at the bottom of the map. Only near the more important towns –to which he pays more attention because of their strategic relevance–

does he draw the relief with greater care. This is true for Badajoz, Elvas, Olivenza and Campo Maior, and can be verified by observing the hills and heights around Badajoz or the *Sierra Dolor* (Alor Mountains), near Olivenza.

Due to the military nature of the map, all these physical elements mentioned seek a practical application in the different military activities that are carried out along the border, as we shall see below. Their appearance on the map is for the basically utilitarian reasons of warfare and not a desire to reflect the topography of the region.

Therefore, it is the second level, the political and military character, that predominates in this chorographic representation, imposing itself on the physical features. Visually, preferential attention of the map focuses on the representation of four towns: *Badajoz*, *Yelves*, *Olivenza* and *Campomayor*, the rest of the localities, if not marginal, occupying at least a position of lesser importance, which translates into a spatial location which is not always correct. This is the case of the *Táliga*, drawn next to *Valverde* (Valverde de Leganés) when in reality is to the south of *Olivenza*, near *Alconchel*. Something similar occurs with *Morón*, which is south of where it is drawn, or *Telena*, which Gainza draws closer to Badajoz than it really was, downstream of the Guadiana.

Among the references to the siege of 1658, that take up a large part of the legend on the map, the information with regard to Badajoz stands out in its great detail, not in vane is it the most important stronghold of the entire Hispano-Portuguese border. Although city streets are not drawn, both fortifications and territory surrounding the city are indicated exhaustively, to the point of facilitating unpublished data on the city's past. Thus the locations of several mills and watermills on the banks of the Guadiana and Rivillas Rivers should be pointed out, and above all, the information with regard to the *picota* (*pillory*), the existence of which was uncertain up till now and which in the drawing appears clearly located next to the San Roque Hermitage.

Also given for Elvas in the legend is information with regard to the siege laid by the Spanish troops under the command of Luis Méndez de Haro at the beginning of 1659, and which ended with the resounding Castilian defeat in the "Battle of the Elvas Lines". Apart from purely military information on the beginning of this event, also outstanding, as in the case of Badajoz, is the detailed information on the surroundings of the Portuguese city, where Fort Graça is not shown, as it was not built until a century later.

The other two relevant strongholds shown, *Campomayor* and *Olivenza*, are also treated in rather good detail. The town of Olivenza appears on the map as belonging to the Castilian Crown, since in May 1657 the fortified town had been taken by the army of Philip IV under the command of the Duke of San Germán. Later, as a consequence of the agreements contained in the Peace Treaty of 1668, Olivenza and its surroundings returned to Portuguese jurisdiction.

As already mentioned above, the rest of the localities shown occupy a secondary place due to their size and strategic relevance. However, knowledge of them was vital from a military point of view, taking into consideration that the troops quartered there depended on them in large part for their maintenance and even for provision of new soldiers if necessary. Furthermore, they allow us to clearly visualize the calamities suffered by a civil population in a long and exhausting conflict that was prolonged for a space of 28 years. In fact, many of these small towns appear abandoned or nearly so, which, not by coincidence, occurs only on the Castilian side. The majority of them were repopulated, with more or less success, at the end of the conflict: *Lapillas*, *Valverde*, *Táliga*, *Villar del Rey*, *Manzanete* (which later would change its name to La Roca de la Sierra), *Los Arcos*, *Almendral y Telena*. Others, on the other hand, such as *Malpartida* and *Santo Toronio*, together with *Talavera*, or *Dos Hermanas*, near Alburquerque, disappeared definitively.

Such a calamitous situation is no other than a reflection of the lack of attention given the Castilian border during the first 18 years of the conflict, years in which the war was sustained to extenuation by the population of the *Raya* on the Castilian border. Meanwhile, on the other side, the negative effects of the war are less visible, that is, in so far as the population is concerned, since in no case was there depopulation.

In contrast to the urban street map, which was not always shown very precisely, the road network was drawn with greater accuracy, as even secondary roads are included. These roads, besides joining the towns, made troop movements from one place to another possible. All the roadways are given similar visual attention and none are given higher or lower ranking, in size or in drawing. Thus, next to a priority road such as *La Calzada de la Puebla de Obando que llega desde Madrid a Lisboa* (*The road of Puebla de Obando which goes from Madrid to Lisbon*), crossing the Botoa farmlands, the Gévora River and the towns of Campo Maior, Elvas and Estremoz, a multitude of little roads and paths are also included drawn in great detail on the map and its legend, in consonance with the strategic military value noted above.

As pointed out above, all the elements already mentioned are susceptible to military use. Therefore, the information with regard to roads, rivers, forests, hills, etc., are represented on the map not only for their merely geographic interest in knowing the terrain, but also for their military value. This circumstance made Gainza's map an important military tool for planning campaigns and precise knowledge of the territory. Thus, for example, the forests may have a double purpose, both defensive –to hide troops and provisions– and offensive –to lay ambushes without much risk. The same function, although with lesser importance, could be attributed to the hermitages that are shown on the map, among which the most outstanding are those located near Badajoz –*San Lázaro, San Roque* and *Santa Engracia*– and those around Albuquerque –*San Juan de las Cortes, Carrión* and *Santa Lucía*– or the then recently built Hermitage of *Nuestra Señora de Bótoa*, halfway between both cities. Likewise, the news concerning the Guadiana, which for most of its way through the zone forms a natural boundary between the two kingdoms, are especially important in so far as they reflect the bridges, the fords and crossings susceptible to use for crossing troops and equipment.

Thus, the entire map provides information of military relevance on the accuracy of which strategic decision-making depended. But there is a series of elements on the map thought of and drawn exclusively for their military function. Such is the case of the numerous mills and fullers, vital to supplying the troops, which are especially abundant between the Carrión Hermitage and Albuquerque –where there were up to 25 of these mills–, and on the banks of the Olivenza River. A similar function was fulfilled by indications of cattle zones, where it would be possible to raid and ambush with a certain success and without danger, as indicated in the legend. It should be recalled that the Hispano-Portuguese war was static, with no important battles, in which the armies of both sides took up “*correr la frontera*” (“*border running*”). That is why only the enemy zones with especially plentiful cattle are shown on the map, which, specifically, are located behind Elvas, at the bottom of the map, near the towns of *Santa Olalla* (Santa Eulalia), *Barvacena* (Barbacena), *Villa Fernando*, *Monforte*, *Asumar* (Assumar) and *Arronches*.

But without doubt, the feature that underlines the military value of the document is that it refers exclusively to the different types of fortification present on one side and the other of the border, by which the disproportion of the focus this conflict was given by the two monarchies confronted can also be measured. Spain found itself embarked on a series of wars all over Europe that took troops and funds from the Portuguese border. Therefore, the fortification of the Spanish populations on the map, when it exists, is done with poor materials

–Talavera, Montijo and Telená– or is antiquated as in Badajoz, whose walls were still medieval, insufficient to resist the attacks of the artillery of the period. Only Fort San Cristóbal, on the other side of the Guadiana River, is built with modern methods.

Facing this apathy on the Castilian side, product of a lack of funds more than pure disinterest, the Portuguese Crown was dedicated to proper fortification of the border strongholds from the moment the conflict began. It is surprising to verify the strength and consistency of the walls of the Portuguese towns, all of them protected according to the new bulwark model. Not only large towns like Elvas, Campo Maior or Olivença –circumstantially in power of the Spanish crown– but also other smaller towns like Juromenha, have defenses adequate for resisting siege and housing troops.

Moreover, those three large Portuguese cities supplement their bulwarked defenses with watchtowers built on the outskirts, as an advance lookout that could sound the alarm if enemy troops appeared. Up to fifteen watchtowers appear around Campo Maior, Elvas and Olivença, while in the Castilian zone –not counting around Olivença– there were only four, all of them around Badajoz: *San Gaspar*, *Caya*, *San Tiago* and *Atalaya Vieja*. Furthermore, scattered around the territory of the Portuguese crown there are a series of forts to protect traffic over certain roads. Thus we find Fort Braganza, which defended the crossing of the Guadiana on the road to Olivença and which was destroyed –as was the bridge– in October 1649, and the *Cassa Fuerte*, on the road between Juromenha and Villa Viçosa, or the *Fort Zapateros*, protecting the route from Elvas to Estremoz.

The border that Gainza draws for us was not a diffuse space, but a real, physical, military zone that is shaped by a well drawn line that separates two territories in time of war, from 1657 to 1659, years during which this border remained stable in spite of the sieges of Badajoz (1658) and Elvas (1659), until in 1659 the town of Mourão was also taken by the Castilians. But it should be recalled that during the 28 years that the War of Secession, or of Restoration, lasted, the border between the two countries underwent numerous changes that the Peace Treaty would erase, redrawing the old boundary again as it was before the beginning of the conflict.

### To find out more:

- CORTÉS CORTÉS, F.: *Militares y Guerra en una Tierra de frontera. Extremadura a mediados del siglo XVII*. Mérida. 1991.

- RODRÍGUEZ SÁNCHEZ, A.: “Guerra, miseria y corrupción en Extremadura 1640-1668”. *Estudios dedicados a Carlos Callejo Serrano*. Cáceres. 1979, pp. 625-645.
- SÁNCHEZ RUBIO, C. y SÁNCHEZ RUBIO, R.: *Badajoz en el Krigsarkivet. El hallazgo de la visión más lejana*. Badajoz, 2003.
- VALLADARES, R.: *La rebelión de Portugal. Guerra, conflicto y poderes en la Monarquía Hispánica (1640-1680)*. Valladolid. 1998.
- To see the evolution of the names given on Gainza’s map, consult the Military Cartography of Spain, by the Centro Geográfico del Ejército and the Portuguese Military Maps of the Instituto Geográfico do Exército.